Abstract-In this paper the existence problem of the equilibrium situation in differential antagonistic games with perfect information and lexicographic payoffs or in a m -dimensional vector-payoffs' game where criteria are strictly ranged with preference relation is studied. The players' dinamic is defined by vector differential ( , , ),
 -equilibrium situation is defined in the game and the conditions of its existence are investiga-terd.
These conditions are mainly about f and g functi-ons.
The main definitions are introduced and some results are formulated from theory of differential games with scalar payoff functions and independent move-ments, they are the main for getting results for analogic differential games in the case of lexicographic payoffs. Some auxiliary statements correctness are also establi-shed, on its basic it is proved that in 
I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the new areas of optimal control theory -the theory of differential games, problems of the pursuit of one controlled object by another are studied; in these problems features appear pertaining to the attainability of different, conflicting objectives. In problems of pur-suit the partners tend to select strategies in order that the chosen criteria give different values, they are in conflict. Another, more general problems in differen-tial games, the partners have their own indices of quality that are different, but depend upon the strategy of each player; the players tend to choose strategies that are best in the sense of their own indices of quality [1] .
The peculiarity of differential games rests in the fact that for optimization of each index of quality there is a characteristic control resource. In control theory the situation is different. The rule of consumption of cont-rol resource is chosen so that all performance indices of the system take on their best values. However, the selection of a control law is effected by optimizing only one of the chosen criteria, which as noted above, is not sufficient in many practical situations.
The lack of control rules that are well defined through conditions of optimizing a scalar criterion leads to the following: The selection and optimization of a given functional answers to only of the require-ments of the control system, while other requirements, that are often equally important, are ignored. The tota-lity of all requirements may be accounted for by a collection of functionals forming a vector of criterion functions, i.e., a vector-valued criterion. Very naturally there arise mathematical problems requiring the simultaneous optimization of a collection of functionals, mesch of which measures a definite aspect of the sys-tem. Important problems of simultaneous optimization of two or more functionals are repeatedly noted by Soviet and foreign scholars [2, 3] .
The paper [4] is devoted to the investigation and solution of differential games with a vector-valued payoff function. Slater, Pareto and Geoffrion -optimal strategies are defined for such a game, and their positive and negative propertes are examined. A new class of solutions called vector-valued guarantees is proposed and their properties examined. According to the authors, this new approach is superior primarily because it has the properties of equivalence and interchangeability -antagonistic players should be able to achieve guaranteed re-sults simultaneously. The approach is tested in a com-petition problem, as well as a pursuit game with noise.
In the given paper we discuss studying antagonistic differential game with m -dimensional vector-payoffs, their criterion are strictly ranged. That means that we'll define differential antagonistic game with lexicographic payoffs. We'll study the problem of the existence Nash equilibrium in it with usual standard conceptions. for the strategies will fulfill the inequalities:
lexicographic strategic game and the set of equilibrium situation of its standard mixed extension note by ( ).
L

 
In such kind of games the main problem is that in every L  game there doesn't exist the equilibrium situation or maybe this set will be empty -
Lexicographic antagonistic defferential games as lexicographic stochastic games [15] , belong to the class of dynamic games.
We'll discuss such games with the given duration and independent movements. Suppose that the first and the second players' condition in every t moment of the duration of the play are described accordingly by relevant of euclidean For the solution of scalar differential games by different authors are constructed different approaches by using two types of solutions -saddle point and  -saddle points existence was proved. For example in [16] paper the existence of saddle point was proved, but it is rather big size and from the intuitive point of view it is difficult to get. But the existence of  -saddle point was proved rather easily for example in [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] papers.
In the process of analysis of the above mentioned approaches it is obvious that the easiest and direct method of the construction of lexicographic differential games is possible on the basis of the second type for-mulization. This kind of approach gives us the oppor-tunity to prove lexicographic  -equilibrium in lexicog-raphic differential games by using a simple mathema-tical apparatus.
II. THE MAIN DEFINITIONS AND SUBSIDIARY RESULTS
In our provement we'll use generalized lemma on the epimorphism in lexicographic case, that was not used by the above mentioned authors for scalar games.
In order to formulate lemma for the players 
Let's define n player's finite m -dimensional lexicographic strategic game and  -equilibrium in it [22] .
is such kind of game.
Let's take the smallest positive numbers 
are connected to each other by means of epimorphism mappings ' : , 
Let's get the main definitions an formulate some results from the theory of differential games with scalar payoff functions and independent movements, they are main for getting results for analogic differential games in the case of lexicographic payoffs.
Suppose the first player's dynamic is defined by vector differential equation
but the second player's dynamic is defined by vector differential equation ( , , ) .
In the given equations () u  and () v  respectively the first and the second players' controlling functions, they 
4) Condition vectors convexity: for every 1 ,
is convex. Below we need the result consists of two parts from control theory [17, 21] . Its first part is from ( , , ) f t x U and ( , , ) g t y V sets convexity, but the second part above Let's take also next result, that gives estimation among trajectories, that is formed by some control and trajectory, it is given from this control by delay of little  time [18] . Proof. The first part of the theorem comes from the definitions, but the proof of the second part we can find in [19] .
Above defined a , ( , ).
   situation will be constructed step step that we note it the following way ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )).
x y
We need the following theorem from the control theorem, its proof comes out from integral's basic features.
Let's discuss a controlling system ( , , ), ( ) , (20) that satisfies all above mentioned standard conditions. Let's discuss one more auxilary discrete lexicog-raphic game with incomplete information and note it the following way 0 0 ( , , ).
L xy 
In this game the players at every move choose control simultaneously, but they don't have information about this move, about his or her partner's choice, but they know both players choice done at previous move.
In 
